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Introduction 
 
 
Core Europe and the United Kingdom 
Risks, Opportunities and Side-effects of the British Reform Proposals 
Nicolai von Ondarza 
The EU is in the midst of completing one of its most delicate negotiations to date – the 
talks on the “EU Reform” with which British Prime Minister David Cameron hopes to 
persuade the British to vote to stay in the Union. The heart of his vision for the EU is 
flexibility. Britain should be given the opportunity to cut loose from further EU integra-
tion and concentrate its membership on a deepened internal market. As such, Cameron 
is proposing to consolidate his nation’s existing special position within an increasingly 
differentiating Union. Concrete political considerations aside, the EU states must there-
fore find answers to two central questions in the negotiations: How much differentia-
tion, how many opt-outs, can the European Union withstand? And how can a single 
market of 28, a Eurozone of 19 and more permanent differentiation be better managed? 
 
Under the impression of manifold crises, 
the European Union is experiencing two 
closely linked parallel processes. On one 
side, differentiation has become a constitu-
tive element of European integration. Over 
the course of the European debt crisis, the 
Eurozone has increasingly consolidated 
into a core Europe that is much more close-
ly economically integrated than the rest of 
the Union. Equally, the refugee crisis, the 
relocation of asylum-seekers and the initia-
tives for joint border protection all only 
affect members of the Schengen zone. 
On the other, during the same time-
frame, precisely the member whose exist-
ing opt-outs from the common currency 
and Schengen actually put it outside the 
current crises asserts a massive need for re-
form. This is of course the United Kingdom. 
After his re-election in May 2015, David 
Cameron kept his promise to set in motion 
a referendum on EU membership and ini-
tiate negotiations with the other member-
states about an “EU reform”. In the talks he 
hopes to achieve a new status for the United 
Kingdom within the Union, in order to per-
suade the sceptics in the British electorate 
and above all in his own party to vote to 
stay in the Union. In his plans for this, dif-
ferentiation is again the central element. 
Demands for Greater Flexibility 
Prime Minister Cameron has very concrete 
ideas about how this is to be accomplished. 
In November 2015, following intense con-
sultations with the other twenty-seven 
governments and technical talks with the 
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EU institutions, he presented his goals for 
“A New Settlement for the United Kingdom 
in a Reformed EU”. If agreement is reached, 
the British government can hold its referen-
dum within four months. London is there-
fore pressing for the talks to be concluded 
by February 2016, in order to hold the vote 
in summer 2016. 
But there will be tough negotiations 
before any agreement can be reached. At a 
superficial level, the British government is 
principally demanding reforms for the 
Union as a whole; in Britain itself the pack-
age has already been dismissed as purely 
symbolic and cosmetic. At second glance, 
however, the proposals amount to a plan to 
turn the Union into a loose network. The 
EU partners should bear these long-term 
consequences in mind if they compromise 
on at least some of the demands to keep the 
United Kingdom in the EU. 
The Internal Market as the Heart of 
European Integration 
Concretely, Cameron is seeking reforms in 
four areas: competitiveness, sovereignty, 
migration and the relationship between 
euro states and non-euro states. While the 
public debate focuses almost entirely on 
the issue of migration, but the three other 
areas also raise tricky questions. At first 
glance the politically least controversial 
topic is competitiveness. Cameron’s de-
mands in this area largely coincide with the 
work programme of the current Commis-
sion and have attracted the most support 
during his tour of European capitals. He 
argues for a deepening of the internal 
market in areas like services, energy and 
the digital economy, and supports both the 
development of a Capital Markets Union 
and the expansion of the EU’s free trade 
agreements, including with the United 
States (TTIP), China, Japan and ASEAN. Al-
though these projects are highly contro-
versial in the European public spheres, and 
in detail between the governments, as gen-
eral goals they enjoy unanimous support at 
EU level. Cameron is not calling for changes 
to EU primary law here, but instead wants 
to press ahead with ongoing legislative and 
negotiating processes. 
Nevertheless, here the British prime min-
ister reveals his vision for the UK’s future 
place in the Union. He wants “the best of 
both worlds”, the advantages of the internal 
market without the obligations that come 
with other areas of integration. In his words, 
he explicitly regards the internal market as 
a matter of free movement of capital, goods 
and services, and thus implicitly excludes 
free movement of persons. He also wishes to 
reduce regulation and labour rights. Even if 
there is a great deal of support for this 
approach, the other member-states should 
insist on the link between internal market 
and free movement, in order to underline 
the fact that even non-EU states like Switzer-
land or Norway cannot have one – market 
access– without the other – free movement 
and shared regulation. 
More than Just Symbolic: Sovereignty 
David Cameron’s second basket of demands 
relates to strengthening British national 
sovereignty versus the European Union. 
First, he wants national parliaments to be 
given greater influence, in the form of the 
right to join together to stop Commission 
legislative initiatives (“red card”). This 
would supposedly enhance the Union’s 
democratic legitimacy – but also implies 
strengthening national parliaments at the 
expense of the European Parliament. Rather 
than demanding a veto just for the British 
House of Commons, Cameron proposes that 
national parliaments should not only be 
able to raise objections to EU legislative 
initiatives – as with the existing “yellow 
card” – but be given the right to completely 
block them. The key question here is the 
size of the required quorum. As long as the 
current quorum of at least one-third of 
national parliaments is kept in place for 
the red card, such a reform would have 
little in the way of practical implications 
for the Union (see SWP-Studie 4/2014). But 
nor would it contribute meaningfully to 
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strengthening the democratic legitimacy 
of the EU or the sovereignty of the United 
Kingdom. 
More decisive for the future structure of 
the EU is the demand to drop the objective 
of an “ever closer Union”. For British Euro-
sceptics that clause is the symbol of what 
they regard as the EU’s boundless appetite 
for power and the transfer of ever more 
powers from London to Brussels. 
The paradox is that even today no mem-
ber-state can be forced to participate in an 
integration project. As the “masters of the 
treaties”, the member states possess a veto 
over any treaty change, a right that London 
in particular has repeatedly threatened to 
use in order to negotiate opt-outs, for ex-
ample on monetary union, the Schengen 
Agreement and the application of the Euro-
pean Charter of Fundamental Rights in the 
UK. No treaty change since the Treaty of 
Maastricht has been adopted without Lon-
don securing a new opt-out to avoid partici-
pating in at least one aspect of integration. 
Conversely, that also means that each time 
London refrained from actually using its 
veto. 
If the other member states were to agree 
to strengthen this principle, there are still 
different means to put this idea into prac-
tice. Cameron’s maximum demand is a 
specific, legally binding opt-out from the 
“ever closer Union” for the United Kingdom. 
This demand is more than just political 
symbolism: Cameron wants not just to 
underline Britain’s permanent rejection of 
further integration – but also lay to rest the 
model of a multi-speed Europe in which the 
member states move at different speeds but 
ultimately towards the same objective, as 
with the euro. If the EU concedes this it will 
be opening the door for two developments: 
On the one hand, it would for the first time 
codify that the only longer-term options are 
core Europe or Europe à la carte, abandon-
ing uniform integration as even a distant 
goal. On the other, it would open the flood-
gates for other member states that might 
wish to back away from the present state of 
integration. That currently means in par-
ticular Hungary and also Poland under its 
new government. 
A better alternative would therefore be 
to reiterate the principle that the member-
states themselves determine their level of 
integration. In fact, a political declaration 
by the European Council in June 2014 al-
ready confirmed that the concept of ever 
closer union “allows for different paths of 
integration for different countries, allowing 
those that want to deepen integration to 
move ahead, while respecting the wish of 
those who do not want to deepen any fur-
ther”. This declaration could be made legal-
ly binding in order to stress the already 
inherent principals that underpin a multi-
speed Europe without completely abandon-
ing the course of European integration. 
One Differentiation Too Far 
Cameron’s third basket of demands also 
involves greater flexibility, namely in rela-
tion to internal migration from elsewhere 
in the EU, which London wishes to restrict. 
As an island outside the Schengen zone, the 
United Kingdom has remained largely 
untouched by the refugee crisis. Following 
the 2004 enlargement, when Tony Blair’s 
Labour government – unlike almost all 
other member-states – directly opened the 
British labour market to workers from the 
accession countries, the UK now hosts more 
than three million people from other EU 
countries. Although in overall economic 
terms Britain has undoubtedly profited from 
this migration, criticisms that London has 
lost control over immigration have caught 
the public imagination. For the British pub-
lic (and thus for the referendum) migration 
is therefore the most important of the four 
areas. At the same time crucial European 
actors like German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel, Commission President Jean-Claude 
Juncker and the Visegrád states have de-
fined freedom of movement as a non-nego-
tiable red line. 
As a result Cameron decided back in 
November 2014 to avoid challenging free-
dom of movement per se. Instead he pro-
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poses to combat abuses of freedom of move-
ment and reduce the incentives for EU citi-
zens to migrate to Britain. He proposes that 
they should first work and pay taxes for 
four years before becoming entitled to re-
ceive British in-work benefits and tax cred-
its. With this, however, London is calling 
into question the fundamental principle 
of non-discrimination, the requirement to 
grant all EU citizens equal treatment. Equal-
ly problematic, Cameron apparently wants 
to introduce differentiation into one of the 
core tenets of the internal market, which 
has been firmly anchored in the treaties 
since the founding of the Union. This is the 
prime example of differentiation being 
used to cherry-pick only those rules that 
benefit a state while rejecting the overall 
principles underpinning the EU. From the 
European perspective that is one differen-
tiation too far, and would seal the shift to a 
Europe à la carte where member-states pick 
and choose only those aspects that serve 
their interests. That would further stretch 
the Union’s already battered cohesion. It is 
hardly surprising that this issue has there-
fore become the make-or-break question in 
the negotiations between the UK and the 
other member states.  
If at all, a compromise should therefore 
be sought that does not involve new privi-
leges for the United Kingdom, but applies 
to all twenty-eight member-states. One pos-
sibility would be – similar to Schengen – to 
give the member-states options to impose 
temporary restrictions in emergencies. As 
the refugee crisis and the current situation 
in the Schengen zone demonstrate, how-
ever, these emergency options would need 
to come with clear temporal and functional 
restrictions. 
A Viable Relationship between 
Eurozone and Non-Euro States 
Cameron’s fourth package of demands is a 
different matter: the relationship between 
the Eurozone and non-euro states in the 
internal market. This is an area whose tech-
nical nature means it plays only a minor 
role for British public opinion – but it is of 
exceptional importance to the British gov-
ernment. In essence, London wants to avoid 
any potential negative effects of staying out 
of the Eurozone. 
The background to demands in this area 
is obvious: the United Kingdom already 
enjoys a permanent opt-out from the third 
stage of monetary union and will not be 
introducing the euro in the foreseeable 
future. But the Eurozone has deepened in 
the course of the European debt crisis since 
2010 and further integration steps are at 
least under discussion. Unlike Denmark, 
Poland or Sweden, Britain has participated 
in none of these integration steps. At the 
same time, with the City of London, it is 
home to the EU’s largest financial centre, 
where euros are traded in greater volumes 
than in Frankfurt or Paris. It is above all the 
financial centre that Cameron wishes to 
protect. Concretely, the British government 
is concerned about two different risks. 
Fear of Discrimination 
First of all, London wants to protect its busi-
nesses from discrimination by the Eurozone. 
Cameron is calling for a ban on discrimina-
tion and greater transparency in Eurozone 
decision-making. As one example of discrim-
ination, British Chancellor of the Exche-
quer George Osborne cited an ECB decision 
of 2011 under which clearing houses trad-
ing primarily in euros must also be based in 
the Eurozone. From the British perspective 
this decision clearly discriminated against 
the City of London and was regarded as an 
attack on the compatibility of the internal 
market with a separate British currency. 
London subsequently successfully chal-
lenged the decision before the European 
Court of Justice. 
From the European perspective this con-
cern should also be regarded as legitimate. 
The general instrument for differentiated 
integration, enhanced cooperation, already 
stipulates that decisions made under its 
scope, such as the financial market trans-
action tax, must have no discriminatory 
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effect in the internal market. In its ruling 
on the ECB decision the European Court of 
Justice suggests that this principle also ap-
plies implicitly in relation to the Eurozone. 
A legal anchoring of such a prohibition of 
discrimination would therefore be accept-
able to the Eurozone and the EU. And as 
long as this principle can only be enforced 
through the courts, the decision-making of 
the Eurozone would not be impaired. 
But Cameron is also demanding that the 
Union formally confirm that it has more 
than one currency (“a multi-currency 
Union”). Presently the euro is treated as the 
currency of the Union, from which certain 
member-states are exempted either perma-
nently (United Kingdom, Denmark) or tem-
porarily (for example Poland, Hungary, 
Sweden). But apart from Britain and Den-
mark, all the other member-states are legal-
ly required to introduce the euro in the 
course of time. Although they will not be 
forced to do so, explicit recognition of a 
multi-currency Union would – like abolish-
ing the objective of an ever closer Union – 
cement a permanent division between Euro-
zone and non-euro states, in the sense of a 
core Europe. 
(No) Eurozone “Caucus” 
Even more important from the British per-
spective is to prevent the Eurozone states 
from joining together to dominate the non-
euro states, including Britain. The possibili-
ty of such a “caucus” has existed in theory 
since November 2014, when the reform 
introducing qualified majority voting in 
the Council of the European Union (under 
the Treaty of Lisbon) came into force after a 
five-year transitional phase. Under the new 
arrangement a decision requires 55 percent 
of the member-states, representing 65 per-
cent of the EU population. Unlike in the 
previous system, whose politically weighted 
voting rights favoured the smaller and 
medium-sized member states, the nineteen 
euro states now possess a qualified majority 
on their own. Thus, they could now push 
through decisions even against all nine 
non-euro states, as they represent 68 percent 
of the EU states and just above 66 percent 
of the EU population. This could strengthen 
the position of the euro states in negotiat-
ing situations, if they were able to agree in 
advance on a joint position. 
But in reality the Eurozone is further 
away than ever from such a unified posi-
tion. In the debt crisis and the protracted 
Greek “rescue”, fundamental differences in 
economic policy alignment – not least be-
tween Berlin and Paris – have exploded into 
open disagreement. In 2011 the introduc-
tion of a financial market transaction tax in 
the EU-28 was torpedoed by the principle of 
unanimity, especially London’s categorical 
rejection. But even within the Eurozone 
there was no united front for the proposal. 
Ultimately only eleven Eurozone states 
joined together in an enhanced cooperation 
to introduce the transaction tax in principle, 
and they have yet to agree on the details. 
But above all, no structural dominance 
of the euro states can be discerned in prac-
tice, not even towards the United Kingdom. 
Examining the about seven hundred votes 
the Council of the EU has published since 
2009, the United Kingdom was outvoted in 
12.6 percent of cases (43 no votes, 46 absten-
tions, source: VoteWatch Europe). That is by 
far the highest figure of all the EU states. 
But this has little to do with its status as a 
non-euro state. The next three on the list 
are Austria, Germany (each 5.6 percent) and 
the Netherlands (4.8 percent), all three of 
which are euro states. Moreover, of the fif-
teen states with which the United Kingdom 
most frequently voted together, only two 
are non-euro states (Sweden and Denmark), 
the rest are euro states. This also holds for 
votes concerning the internal market. 
No Quasi-Veto 
Various models for better safeguarding 
British interests in the EU are nonetheless 
being discussed in London. David Cameron 
has not laid out a specific demand here, but 
merely insists that questions that affect all 
member-states must also be negotiated and 
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decided by all. As such he is implicitly call-
ing for safeguards. Two principal options 
are under discussion at Westminster, both 
of which are unacceptable to the Eurozone 
for different reasons: 
On the one hand, the British Think-Tank 
Open Europe and others have proposed 
new blocking options for non-euro states, 
to permit them to continue to assemble a 
blocking minority. The model for this is the 
special arrangements for the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) introduced in 
2013 in the course of establishing the Bank-
ing Union. The EBA is an agency of all twen-
ty-eight EU states tasked with harmonising 
banking regulation and control in the part-
ner countries. After banking oversight was 
supranationalised for the Eurozone, the 
non-euro states in the EBA were granted a 
safeguard to prevent them being outvoted. 
For important decisions the EBA now re-
quires a majority of both the nineteen euro 
states and the nine states not involved in 
Eurozone banking oversight. Thus de facto 
five non-euro states possess a weight equal 
to that of ten euro states. 
Applied to the EU as a whole, Open 
Europe now proposes that either rejection 
by three non-euro states should be sufficient 
to block decisions in the Council, if they 
believe the internal market or core princi-
ples of the EU to be endangered, or that to 
achieve the same effect the hurdles for 
blocking minorities should be lowered. This 
could occur either via a treaty change or 
by amending the “Ioannina compromise” 
to allow member states representing just 
20 percent of the EU population to block a 
decision (rather than the current 35 per-
cent). Following this model for example, 
the United Kingdom (12.6 percent of the 
population) and Poland (7.5 percent) could 
prevent a decision on their own. Regardless 
of the details of implementation, both pro-
posals aim to lower the threshold to form a 
blocking minority so that it would be sig-
nificantly easier for London to stop any EU 
initiatives it disapproved of, for example in 
connection with financial market regula-
tion. This would also expand the blocking 
options and weight of the non-euro states 
in relation to the euro states, from which 
Britain as the most populous and influen-
tial non-euro state would especially profit. 
The second option discussed in London – 
a safeguard in the form of an “emergency 
brake” for non-euro states in the internal 
market – is problematic for other reasons. 
The EU already has such emergency brakes, 
for example in interior and justice policy, 
where a group of EU states can in certain 
cases stop a legislative procedure in the 
Council of the EU and have it referred to 
the European Council. The latter then has 
four months time to reach an agreement, 
which must be by consensus. If that cannot 
be achieved the only remaining option for 
the other EU states is to establish an en-
hanced cooperation, whose procedures are 
then simplified. 
Although this variant would at first 
glance permit the other EU states to push 
forward on controversial matters without 
Britain, it comes with two central prob-
lems. Firstly, the treaty forbids the use of 
enhanced cooperation in areas that would 
endanger the internal market. So in that 
sphere, which is especially important to 
London, the process would end with the 
European Council or an enhanced coopera-
tion would be open to legal challenge. Sec-
ondly, from the British perspective forcing 
differentiation in the sector it regards as its 
top priority, financial market regulation, 
could in fact be advantageous if it permit-
ted the City of London to insulate itself from 
stricter regulation in the rest of Europe. For 
example, the British government vehe-
mently rejects the cap on bankers’ bonuses 
adopted by the EU in 2013 and would cer-
tainly have used an “emergency brake” to 
detach itself from the rest of the EU and 
gain a competitive advantage, even in a 
matter where the decision had nothing to 
do with the relationship between Eurozone 
and non-euro states. 
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A Mechanism for Political Compromise 
Thus from the European and German per-
spectives neither of the two proposals are 
acceptable. Above all, they would not con-
tribute to balancing the relationship be-
tween a closely integrated Eurozone and the 
non-euro states, but instead strengthen the 
latter at the expense of the EU as a whole. 
Lessons should instead be drawn from 
the one case that British representatives 
cite as a prime example of the formation of 
a Eurozone “caucus”: the use of the Euro-
pean Financial Stabilisation Mechanism 
(EFSM). Unlike the similarly-named Euro-
pean Financial Stability Mechanism (ESM), 
the EFSM is funded by all twenty-eight EU 
member states. Consequently, in 2011 the 
non-euro states were given a political com-
mitment that EFSM funds would no longer 
be used to support euro states. But in the 
negotiations with Greece in summer 2015 
the Commission believed the EFSM to be 
the only European instrument suitable for 
providing Greece with short-term bridging 
loans until long-term ESM credits could be 
provided. In July 2015 the euro states agreed 
to tap the EFSM facility without previously 
consulting the non-euro states, and could 
in theory have imposed that decision on 
their own thanks to their qualified major-
ity. Britain, whose prime minister had ex-
plicitly promised not to participate in 
rescuing euro states, was extremely dis-
pleased, as were Sweden and Poland. 
In subsequent negotiations it was agreed 
that while the EFSM could still be used, the 
non-euro states received a guarantee that 
the euro states would bear their losses in 
the event of Greece becoming insolvent dur-
ing the bridging period. The decisive aspect 
for the structure of the EU here is less the 
technical than the political solution, which 
ultimately led to a compromise acceptable 
to all. So what the Eurozone and the non-
euro states need are not new blocking in-
struments, but a mechanism that forces 
compromise in an increasingly differentiat-
ing Union. 
One way to achieve this would be to im-
plement the emergency brake proposal in a 
purely suspensive form. Under this model 
any EU state that believed the fundamental 
principles of equal participation had been 
violated could delay a legislative procedure 
in the Council for a maximum of three 
months or until the next European Council, 
whichever comes first. This period of height-
ened political attention would force the 
heads of state and government to search for 
a compromise. If they fail, the decision can 
be taken anyway. But the majority must 
then accept that it is outvoting the minori-
ty under full public scrutiny. This approach 
would avoid decisions being held up indefi-
nitely, while the pressure to find a compro-
mise could contribute considerably more to 
cohesion in the Union than divisive new 
veto options. 
The Transformation of the 
European Union 
The British demands encounter a European 
Union that is already undergoing a diffi-
cult transformation after years in crisis 
mode. Differentiated integration has be-
come the modus operandi, without which 
scarcely a step forward can be taken at the 
EU level. The EU partners must now decide 
how to respond to the British demands for 
greater differentiation. Outside the big 
issue of treaty change (see SWP Comment 
50/2015) and the other politically no less 
crucial current questions (deepening inter-
nal markets, role of national parliaments, 
rules on freedom of movement) the mem-
ber states’ response to the British catalogue 
of demands will incisively define the future 
structure of the Union. Three paths are 
open: 
Firstly, the EU partners can reject Lon-
don’s demands. Although no EU state takes 
the prospect of a British exit lightly, the 
resistance remains very strong in certain 
member states and public spheres, in par-
ticular regarding demands involving dif-
ferentiated treatment of EU citizens. But 
in so doing the EU would show itself to be 
rigid and incapable of reform, and play into 
the hands of opponents across Europe. A 
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Brexit would do great harm to both sides, 
symbolically, politically and economically. 
The second option would be for the EU 
partners to largely concede Cameron’s de-
mands, either to keep the United Kingdom 
in the Union or because certain other EU 
governments in fact share some of his reser-
vations about further integration. That, 
however, would not only widen the differ-
entiation within the EU but clearly point 
down the road to a Europe à la carte, in 
which national interests are placed before 
European solidarity – even more strongly 
than is already the case in the euro and 
refugee crises. That would be another step 
towards the political disintegration of the 
Union. At the same time, even these reforms 
would be insufficient to dispel the funda-
mental reservations of the British Euroscep-
tics, and offer no guarantee for a “remain” 
vote in the referendum. 
The third way would be to take the 
negotiations with London as a starting 
point for reordering the European Union’s 
complex differentiated structure. While an 
outcome to the satisfaction of all might not 
be achievable within the ambitious British 
timetable, agreement could be within reach 
if the EU partners reject excessive differen-
tiation, implement procedures for finding 
compromise rather than blockades between 
Eurozone and non-Eurozone, and adapt the 
objective of an ever closer Union to an EU 
that is heading gradually towards a core 
Europe. In that way the negotiations with 
London could actually lay the foundations 
for a more stable structure for an increas-
ingly differentiated Union. 
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